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Abstract: This paper examines digital data-driven platforms and their impact on contemporary 
regulatory paradigms. While these phenomena are increasingly proclaimed as paradigm altering 
in many respects, they remain relatively little understood, including in their regulatory 
dimension. Lawmakers around the globe including the European Commission are currently 
trying to make sense of these evolutions and determine how to regulate digital platforms. In its 
2016 Communication on Online Platforms, the European Commission proposed various 
options for regulating the platform economy, including self-regulatory and co-regulatory 
models. The Commission’s assumption that self-regulation or co-regulation can replace top-
down legislative intervention in the platform economy forms the background of this paper, 
which examines these three options to determine their respective suitability. We shall conclude 
that as command-and-control regulation as well as self-regulation raise significant problems in 
their application to the platform economy, co-regulation emerges as the most adequate option 
if certain conditions are met 
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This paper examines digital data-driven platforms and their impact on 
contemporary regulatory paradigms. The phenomena of digitalization and 
datafication are disrupting established business models.1 Much has been written 
about the macro- and microeconomic effects of digital platforms and their 
lifeblood: big data. There appears to be growing consensus that we are currently 
witnessing a profound paradigmatic change as it has been argued that platforms, in 
conjunction with big data, artificial intelligence and 3D printing constitute the 
‘fourth industrial revolution’.2 Yet, despite such proclamations, the digitalization 
and datafication of the economy remain relatively little understood, including in 
their regulatory dimension. Lawmakers around the globe including the European 
Commission are currently trying to make sense of these evolutions and determine 
how to regulate digital platforms.  
In its 2016 Communication on Online Platforms, the European Commission 
provided a first assessment of the regulatory challenges posed by online platforms 
and proposed several avenues of how related objectives could be achieved. 
Strikingly, the Commission not only pondered the possibility for legislative 
intervention but moreover suggested that ‘principles-based self-regulatory/co-
regulatory measures, including industry tools for ensuring application of legal 
requirements and appropriate monitoring mechanisms, can play a role’.3 This 
statement, by which the Commission suggests that self-regulation or co-regulation 
can replace legislative intervention in the platform economy forms the background 
of this paper, which examines these three options to determine their respective 
suitability. This question is of no small detail, as in fast-changing environments; 
regulations have ‘enormous potential for both good and harm’ and must promote 
the public good while also preventing adverse effects on innovation.4 The EU’s 
first steps in regulating platforms will be of no small importance as they’ll shape 
the contours of the platform economy in the EU, and arguably also beyond.5 
Regulators are faced with two interrelated questions in this context. Firstly, 
who should regulate platforms; and, secondly, how they should be regulated. Largely 
setting aside aspects of substantive law, this essay focuses on the determination of 
appropriate regulatory actors in this domain. As a preliminary point it should be 
noted that when discussing platform regulation we need to distinguish their internal 
operation, including questions of data protection, the legal qualification of non-
personal data, liability, consumer protection and internal dispute resolution 
                                                     
1 For an introduction, see Viktor Mayer-Schönberger and Kenneth Cukier, Big Data (Houghton Mifflin 
Harcourt 2013).  
2 Klaus Schwab, The Fourth Industrial Revolution (World Economic Forum 2016). 
3 European Commission, ‘Communication on Online Platforms and the Digital Single Market. 
Opportunities and Challenges for Europe’ COM (2016) 288 final, 5 (hereafter European Commission, 
‘Communication on Online Platforms and the Digital Single Market’). 
4 United States Office of Management and Budget, ‘Report to Congress on the costs and benefits of 
federal regulations,’ Chapter 1.3, http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/inforeg_chap1#bpabc. 
5 See generally Anu Bradford, ‘The Brussels Effect’ (2012) 107 Northwestern University Law Review 1; 
Christopher Kuner, ‘The Internet and the Global Reach of EU Law,’ LSE Law, Society and Economy 
Working Paper 4/2017. 
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 3 
mechanisms from their external consequences, which include, for instance, the effect 
of home-sharing on urban housing policies or the effect of skill- and time-sharing 
platforms on labour relations. These distinctions must be borne in mind as when it 
comes to platforms’ internal operation standards applying homogenously 
throughout the internal market are easier to define than in respect of their external 
consequences where national and subnational actors are, in accordance with 
competence-division and subsidiarity, often the appropriate scale of regulation.  
Our analysis proceeds as follows. We shall first provide an overview of the 
platform economy and its definitional challenges before venturing on to 
investigate various regulatory models that have been suggested as possible 
regulatory avenues. This includes an analysis of command-and-control regulation; 
self-regulation and co-regulation to determine their suitability in addressing the 
regulatory challenges inherent to digital data-driven platforms. 
 
 
 
I. THE PLATFORM ECONOMY 
 
Over the past years new business models centred on data-driven digital platforms 
emerged in addition to their more senior counterparts GAFA (Google, Amazon, 
Facebook and Apple). They include most famously the home-sharing platform 
Airbnb and ride-sharing platform Uber, peer-lending platforms such as Kickstarter 
and Lending Club, the fashion platforms such as Rent the Runway, but also time- 
and skill-sharing platforms like Upwork and Taskrabbit, to name just a few. 
Providing a precise definition of a digital platform is no easy undertaking. This 
starts with a terminological challenge. The platform economy encompasses 
various phenomena, which have for example been termed the ‘sharing economy’6, 
the ‘gig economy’, the ‘mesh economy’7 and the ‘Uberization of everything’.8 
Lobel has rightly observed that ‘no term completely captures the entire scope of 
the paradigmatic shift in the ways we produce, consume, work, finance, and 
learn’.9 Regulators have started crafting legal definitions capable of capturing the 
diversity of platforms. The French Conseil National du Numérique considers a 
platform to be a service that provides an intermediary function in the access of 
information, goods or services that are usually provided by third persons.10 The 
                                                     
6 For an overview, see  Nestor Davidson, Michèle Finck and John Infrance, Cambridge Handbook of the Law 
and Regulation of the Sharing Economy (Cambridge University Press 2018).  
7 Lisa Gansky, The Mesh: Why the Future of Business is Sharing (Penguin 2010). 
8 Sunny Freeman, ‘Uberization’ of Everything is Happening, but not every ‘Uber’ will succeed, 
Huffington Post (1 April, 2015), http://www.huffingtonpost.ca/2015/04/01/uberization-uber-of-
everything_n_6971752.html.  
9 Orly Lobel, ‘The Law of the Platform’ (2016) 101 Minnesota Law Review 88, 88. 
10 Conseil National du Numérique, ‘Ambition Numérique. Pour une Politique Française et Européenne 
de la Transition Numérique’ (2015) 59 (‘[u]ne plateforme pourrait être définie comme un service 
occupant une fonction d’intermédiaire dans l’accès aux informations, contenus, services ou biens, le plus 
souvent édités ou fournis par des tiers’). 
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European Commission has recently defined a platform as ‘an undertaking 
operating in two (or multi)-sided markets, which uses the Internet to enable 
interactions between two or more distinct but interdependent groups of users so 
as to generate value for at least one of the groups’.11 The European Parliament has 
adopted a different position and considers that ‘it would be very difficult to arrive 
at a single, legally relevant and future-proof definition of online platforms at EU 
level, owing to factors such as the great variety of types of existing online 
platforms and their areas of activity, as well as the fast-changing environment of 
the digital world’.12 It suggested that as a consequence platforms ‘should be 
distinguished and defined in relevant sector-specific legislation at EU level 
according to their characteristics, classifications and principles’.13 Amidst such 
definitional challenges it is easier to define the platform by what it is not: 
conventional, static, and easy to qualify. These characteristics explain why 
platforms continue to puzzle observes, including regulators. 
The key characteristics of the digital economy set it apart from the post-
industrial model of recent decades. It can thus be argued that similarly to the 
economic transformations of the past a new regulatory model is needed to 
accompany economic shifts.14 The current state of affairs is characterised by 
uncertainty regarding applicable rules that is exacerbated by regulatory 
fragmentation stemming from divergent regulatory tactics between and within 
Member States.15 Such uncertainty, coupled with ill-suited legal frameworks, risks 
stifling innovation, a concern that is particularly resonant in the EU, which lags 
behind Asia and the United States in digital innovation.16 In light of regulatory 
uncertainty and potentially out-dated rules largely fashioned for offline commerce 
platforms are currently subject to legal categories and regimes that seem ill-
suited.17 Regulatory uncertainty is a double-edged sword that can slow down 
platforms’ development but equally bears the risk of facilitating the uncontrolled 
                                                     
11 European Commission, ‘Public Consultation on the Regulatory Environment for Platforms, Online 
Intermediaries, Data and Cloud Computing and the Collaborative Economy’ (2015) 5, 
https://ec.europa.eu/digital-single-market/en/news/public-consultation-regulatory-
environmentplatforms-online-intermediaries-data-and-cloud. 
12 Report of the European Parliament on Online Platforms and the Digital Single Market (2016/2276 
(INI)), available at: http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?type=REPORT&reference=A8-
2017-0204&format=XML&language=EN.  
13 Ibid.  
14 For a discussion, see Carlota Perez, Technological Revolutions and Financial Capital: The Dynamics of Bubbles 
and Golden Ages (Edward Elgar 2002). 
15 Report of the European Parliament on Online Platforms and the Digital Single Market (2016/2276 
(INI)), http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?type=REPORT&reference=A8-2017-
0204&format=XML&language=EN. 
16 In its Communication on Online Platforms, the European Commission could only mention BlaBlaCar 
and Skyscanner as globally competitive platforms from the EU. ‘Communication on Online Platforms 
and the Digital Single Market’ (supra note 3) 3. 
17 See also Vassilis Hatzopoulos and Sofia Roma, ‘Caring for Sharing? The Collaborative Economy Under 
EU Law’ (2017) 54 Common Market Law Review 81. 
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 5 
expansion of platform power.18 Platform power is indeed increasingly becoming a 
cause of concern, also for EU institutions.19  
Regulators accordingly face no easy task considering the lack of 
understanding of platforms’ very definition, their impact, and also how they 
operate given that their algorithms and the data they run on are generally 
proprietary and closed.20 The resulting information asymmetry burdens any 
discussions regarding appropriate regulatory solutions. The platform economy has 
moreover let to the emergence of hybrid categories unknown to the law, such as 
‘prosumers’ (an individual that is both a provider and a consumer in the platform 
economy) and blurs established legal categories such as residential and commercial 
real estate or freelancer and employee.21 Platforms themselves have been very 
vocal as to what they consider regulatory challenges and solutions. A crucial point 
to note is that the regulatory disruption created by platforms is not an accidental 
effect of the platform economy but rather a constituent characteristic thereof.22   
The European Commission’s first reaction was one of regulatory reluctance 
as it is yet to propose concrete legislative proposals. Cauffmann and Smits noted 
that the most interesting aspect of the Commission’s position on platforms is that 
it is willing to go along with industry claims that these new business models should 
benefit from the application of less stringent rules.23 In the meantime, platforms 
operate in the ensuing legal vacuum. They do not operate anarchically, however, 
but rather self-regulate where they are not subject to more dated legal principles. 
Their development has been largely extra-legal. As pressure to regulate mounts 
and as judicial challenges accumulate, the Commission will likely have to qualify 
some regulatory aspects in the not too distant future, including the qualification of 
regulatory actors.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                     
18 On the risks thereof, see Orla Lynskey, ‘Regulating “Platform Power”’ LSE Law, Society and Economy 
Working Papers 1/2017. Frank Pascquale, The Black Box Society (Harvard University Press 2015). 
19 See Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European 
Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions, ‘A Digital Single Market Strategy for 
Europe’ COM (2015) 192 final, 12 (‘[s]ome online platforms have evolved to become players competing 
in many sectors of the economy and the way they use their market power raises a number of issues that 
warrant further analysis beyond the application of competition law in specific cases’). 
20 On this, see generally Frank Pascquale (n 18). 
21 Andy Kessler, ‘Brian Chesky: The “Sharing Economy” and Its Enemies’, Wall Street Journal, 17 
January 2014, https://www.wsj.com/articles/brian-chesky-the-8216sharing-economy8217-and-its-
enemies-1390003096.  
22 Elizabeth Pollman and Jordan Barry, ‘Regulatory Entrepreneurship’ (2017) 90 Southern California Law 
Review 383.  
23 Caroline Cauffman and Jan Smits, ‘The Sharing Economy and the Law. Food for European Lawyers’ 
(2016) 23 Maastricht Journal of European and Comparative Law 903, 907. 
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II. REGULATING THE PLATFORM ECONOMY 
 
It has already been seen above that we must distinguish between the ‘who’ and the 
‘how’ of platform regulation. In respect of the suitable regulatory actors the 
Commission has put three distinct options on the table: traditional top-down 
secondary legislation, self-regulation or co-regulation. This section introduces 
these three regulatory models and evaluates their applicability to the platform 
economy. Before venturing on to this task, however, it should be borne in mind 
that while these denominations point towards various approaches to regulation, 
they operate on a spectrum.24 
 
A. COMMANDING-AND-CONTROLLING PLATFORMS  
 
Online platforms are partly self-regulating entities also caught by existing 
supranational rules, including consumer protection provisions, the protection of 
personal data, Articles 101 and 102 TFEU and the fundamental economic 
freedoms.25 As these frameworks mostly pre-date online platforms the question of 
legislative amendment has emerged which could take the form of modifying 
existing legal frameworks such as the E-Commerce Directive or create new 
legislation.26 As a preliminary note it should be stressed that where top-down 
legislation is the preferred option, the subsidiarity argument would point towards 
harmonized EU legislation, at least regarding platforms’ internal operation given 
that ‘there cannot be 28 different sets of rules for online platform in a single 
market’.27 
Command-and-control regulation, also referred to as ‘top-down’ regulation, 
is what typically comes to mind when thinking about regulating economic 
behaviour: legislation. It has been defined as ‘regulation by the state, which is 
often assumed to take a particular form, that is the use of legal rules backed by 
criminal sanctions’.28 The EU’s regulatory activity is indeed generally associated 
with secondary legislation crafted under the ordinary legislative procedure.29 This 
echoes that law is traditionally State- or EU-centred, unified, hierarchical and 
                                                     
24 Tony Prosser, ‘Self-Regulation, Co-Regulation and the Audio-Visual Media Services Directive’ (2008) 
31 Journal of Consumer Policy 99, 99.  
25 Rupprecht Podszun and Stephan Kreifels, ‘Digital Platforms and Competition Law’ (2016) 5 Journal of 
European Consumer and Market Law 33;. 
26 Directive 2000/31/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 8 June 2000 on certain legal 
aspects of information society services, in particular electronic commerce, in the Internal Market OJ L 
178/1 (2000).  
27 European Commission, ‘Communication on Online Platforms and the Digital Single Market’ (supra 
note 3) 4. 
28 Julia Black, ‘Decentring Regulation: Understanding the Role of Regulation and Self-Regulation in a 
“Post-Regulatory” World’ (2001) 54 Current Legal Problems 103, 105. 
29 Article 294 TFEU. 
  
Michèle Finck                                          Digital Regulation 
 
 
 7 
unpinned by the rule of law.30 Regulation should be simple, constant, and 
predictable and these objectives are conventionally fulfilled through 
homogenously-applying legislation. EU law, it has been suggested, ‘has tended to 
stand in awe of [the] traditional conception of law’.31 This is rooted in the fact that 
‘not only are those attributes of a traditional conception of law consistent with the 
ever closer integration motif, but they speak too of power and uncompromising 
authority, in real as well as symbolic terms, and never is power and authority more 
desired than when it is contested, as in the case of the EU’.32 
In light of the above top-down legislation could appear to be the evident 
method of platform regulation. It would create uniformity across the Union as the 
Commission indeed considers that ‘[r]egulatory uncertainty and fragmentation 
across and within Member States complicates (or even impedes) market access and 
limits investment opportunities for platforms’.33 Numerous characteristics of 
platforms however provide reason to doubt that secondary legislation would be an 
effective mode of regulation. First, we must return to the information asymmetry 
that characterises the platform economy in the absence of reliable information 
about these black boxes as well as their socio-economic impact. It is true that 
information gathering always plagues any lawmaker.34 This issue is nonetheless 
particularly salient with respect to the platform economy, as experience remains 
limited. Legislating despite the prevailing information gap bears three central risks. 
The adoption of ill-suited principles may firstly stifle innovation, and end up 
harming platforms and the economy. Second, the rules adopted may not be 
enforceable or be very burdensome to enforce.35 Third, specific platform 
regulation is often considered to simply add more regulation (especially on 
consumer protection and e-commerce) where there already is a complex regulatory 
framework. There are gaps in understanding these autonomous technological 
systems and that these gaps also affect some of the main actors involved in law 
making, politicians and civil servants, who often lack the necessary expertise to 
make sense of the little information that is available about platforms. 
It is important to remember that while top-down legislation may be our go-to 
option it is far from perfect. It facilitates forum shopping, which is far from 
speculative, considering how early tech firms have incorporated in jurisdictions 
known for their lenient application of data protection standards. We should be 
wary of idealizing legislation as always constituting the most advantageous mode 
of economic regulation. Whereas it is tempting to suggest that it is the most 
                                                     
30 Michael Wilkinson, ‘Three Conceptions of Law: Towards A Jurisprudence of Democratic 
Experimentalism’ (2010) Wisconsin Law Review 673, 673-4. 
31 Joanne Scott and David Trubek, ‘Mind the Gap: Law and New Approaches to Governance in the 
European Union’ (2002) 8 European Law Journal 1, 9. 
32 Ibid,10. 
33 Commission Staff Working Document, ‘A Single Market Strategy for Europe: Analysis and Evidence’, 
SWD (2015) 202 final, 6.  
34 Stephen Breyer, Regulation and its Reforms (Harvard University Press 1984) 109-18. 
35 An example would be German cities’ attempt to enforce the ‘Zweckentfremdungsverbot’ that is 
examined further below. 
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democratic and legitimate mode of regulation, reality casts doubt on such 
simplistic statements, particularly so in the context of a supranational law-making 
process shaped by opaque trilogues.37 Top-down regulation furthermore relies on 
few ‘well-educated, specially trained, and publically appointed professionals’38 
leaving little room for polycentric deliberation and compromise. Equally, while we 
presume that all regulation is designed to enhance the public good we long know 
that regulation can also be designed to enhance the interests of lobbyist or other 
entrenched stakes.39  
The above observations accordingly cast doubt on whether top-down 
legislation will really enable regulations to moderate between the dilemma of not 
stifling innovation on the one hand, and not leaving innovative practices 
unregulated on the other.40 We must thus think of other options. De Búrca has 
shown that two different kinds of impetus mandate reliance on new governance 
methods as opposed to top-down legislation: strategic uncertainty, defined as 
complex policy problems that have not ‘shown themselves to be readily 
amendable to resolution whether through hierarchy, market or otherwise’ and 
interdependence ‘where divergent regulatory regimes affect one another to varying 
degrees, creating externalities, giving rise to conflict, or hindering transactional or 
personal mobility’.41 We can readily see that these elements are present in the 
platform economy characterised by uncertainty and complexity where various 
systems are in need of alignment. It has equally been suggested that ‘the intensity 
with which a given problem presents may be likely to affect the vitality and success 
of an experimentalist-governance solution’.42 While chronic problems may be best 
addressed by command-and-control legislation, new governance methods are 
better suited for acute and novel issues that are subject to rapid change such as 
platforms. 
The territorial dimension of the platform economy is particularly salient and 
must be borne in mind whenever different regulatory options are pondered. On 
the one hand, platforms don’t respect jurisdictions as they spread via the World 
Wide Web. Similarly, we can at least assume that many elements of their internal 
functioning are identical notwithstanding where users relying on its intermediary 
function are located. On the other hand, however, the external effects of 
platforms diverge dramatically depending on the geographical location at stake and 
                                                     
37 Giandomenico Majone, ‘The Rise of the Regulatory State in Europe’ (1994) 17 West European Politics 
3.  
38 Orly Lobel, ‘The Renewal Deal: The Fall of Regulation and the Rise of Governance in Contemporary 
Legal Thought’ (2004) 89 Minnesota Law Review 342, 371. 
39 George Stigler, ‘The Theory of Economic Regulation’ (1971) 2 Bell Journal of Economics and 
Management 1, 3; Fred McChesney, ‘Rent Extraction and Rent Creation in the Economic Theory of 
Regulation’ (1987) 16 Journal of Legal Science 1.  
40 See further Sofia Ranchordás, ‘Does Sharing Mean Caring? Regulating Innovation in the Sharing 
Economy’ (2015) 16 Minnesota Journal of Law, Science & Technology 413. 
41 Gráinne de Búrca, ‘New Governance and Experimentalism: An Introduction’ (2010) Wisconsin Law 
Review 227, 232.  
42 Ibid, 233. 
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different policies may be appropriate for different cities within the same country, 
and sometimes even different areas of the same city.43 Supranational secondary 
legislation is hence both under-inclusive and over-inclusive given that it catches 
both too wide and too narrow a net. Concluding that top-down legislation risks 
constituting an unsuitable method of regulating platforms we now turn to the 
alternatives, starting with self-regulation. 
 
B. SELF-REGULATING PLATFORMS 
 
Platforms are already self-regulating entities. They determine the terms and 
conditions of their intermediary function and define online and offline standards 
of behaviour. Platforms commonly argue that they should be free from any 
outside interference and entirely govern themselves considering that they have 
more knowledge and better enforcement mechanisms than public authorities. This 
section introduces the regulatory model underlying such claims and tests its 
application to digital data-driven platforms.  
 
1. The Notion of Self-Regulation 
In the EU context, self-regulation has been defined as ‘the possibility for 
economic operators, the social partners, non-governmental organisations or 
associations to adopt amongst themselves and for themselves common guidelines 
at European level (particularly codes of practice or sectoral agreements)’.44 
According to Black self-regulation  ‘describes the situation of a group of persons 
or bodies, acting together, performing a regulatory function in respect of 
themselves and others who accept their authority.’45 This is distinguished from 
‘individualised regulation’, which is ‘regulation which is tailored to the individual 
firm’.46 Given that current debates concerning the platform sector understand self-
regulation as regulation for the individual platform, which reflects that they already 
are their own de facto independent standard-setter, we will use the notion of self-
regulation to also include individual regulation.  
Self-regulation can take a number of forms as it can be mandated by public 
authorities or adopted voluntarily. Similarly the incentives for self-regulation vary 
as it can echo an attempt to operate under set internal standards, align industry 
behaviour, or counter threats of statutory intervention by public authorities. Self-
regulation is far from being a novel phenomenon as it has long been relied on in 
complex sectors such as nuclear energy and finance, confirming its suitability in 
                                                     
43 In the U.S., the city of New Orleans for instance has different rules on short-term rentals depending 
on the area at stake. See further https://www.nola.gov/short-term-rentals/.  
44 Interinstitutional Agreement on Better Law-Making (2003) OJ C 321, para 22. 
45 Julia Black, ‘Constitutionalising Self-Regulation’ (1996) 59 Modern Law Review 24, 27.  
46 Ibid, 27.   
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contexts of complexity.47 Self-regulation has similarly been relied on to regulate 
the professions, such as through Bar Associations. This section highlights the self-
regulatory nature of prominent sharing economy platforms and looks towards the 
future in enquiring whether self-regulation constitutes an adequate long-term 
regulatory option. While this essay focuses on platforms themselves it must be 
stressed that current economic shifts will test self-regulation also in ancillary 
domains, including but not limited to the self-regulation of the relatively new 
profession of the ‘data scientist’.  
Before venturing on to the examination of self-regulating platforms, we 
should stress that as a general matter technology is a de facto self-regulating force, 
best exemplified by Lessig’s maxim of ‘code is law’ that reflects that often code, 
not law, reflects what individuals can and cannot do.48 This has been confirmed in 
many respects, including data protection law49 and is today proven true by the 
centrality of platforms’ algorithms as governance actors. It can indeed not be 
denied that platforms have become the relevant ‘rule-makers’.50 Nonetheless, the 
fact that code acts as law does not mean that it should operate independently of 
law. We now move to discuss curtrent examples of self-regulation.   
 
2.  Examples of Self-Regulation  
Platforms can be understood as self-regulating systems that act independently but 
also in collaboration with other platforms to establish industry standards. It has 
been suggested that ‘the Internet, and the rapid growth of the sharing economy, 
alleviates the need for much of this top-down regulation, with these recent 
innovations likely doing a much better job of serving consumer needs’.51 This for 
instance occurs through regular meetings where platforms discuss issues of trust, 
safety and security.52 This has led some to compare platforms to governments as 
‘like governments, each platform is in the business of developing policies which 
enable social and economic activity that is vibrant and safe’.53 Given that little is 
known about the frequency, form and outcome of such meetings, this section 
                                                     
47 Neil Gunningham and Joseph Rees, ‘Industry Self-Regulation: an Institutional Perspective’ (1997) 19 
Law & Policy 363. Elizabeth Howlett et al, ‘The Role of Self-Regulation, Future Orientation and 
Financial Knowledge in Long-Term Financial Decisions’ (2008) 42 Journal of Consumer Affairs 223. 
48 Lawrence Lessig, Code and Other Laws of Cyberspace (Basic Books 1999) (hereafter ‘Lessig, Code and other 
Laws of Cyberspace’). 
49 Agustín Rossi, ‘Internet Privacy: Who Sets the Global Standard?’ (2014) 49 Italian Journal of 
International Affairs 65.  
50 Marta Cantero Gomito, ‘Regulation.com. Self-Regulation and Contract Governance in the Platform 
Economy: A Research Agenda’ (2017) 9 European Journal of Legal Studies 53 (hereafter ‘Cantero, 
Regulation.com’). 
51 Christopher Koopman et al. ‘The Sharing Economy and Consumer Protection Regulation: The Case 
for Policy Change’ (2014) Mercatus Working Paper, 1 https://www.mercatus.org/publication/sharing-
economy-and-consumer-protection-regulation-case-policy-change. 
52 Nick Gossman, White Paper: Regulation, the Internet Way. A Data-First Model for Establishing Trust, 
Safety, and Security (2015) http://datasmart.ash.harvard.edu/news/article/white-paper-regulation-the-
internet-way-660. (hereafter ‘Gossman, Regulation the Internet Way’). 
53 Ibid. 
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focuses on the information that is available in respect of platforms regulating 
themselves. The key argument that has been advanced in favour of self-regulation 
is information asymmetry as most information regarding platforms’ functioning 
and impact is at the exclusive disposal of platforms themselves. There is a 
tendency for the industry to argue that when it comes to regulation ‘the answer is 
in the data’ yet only platforms have access to operational data, which not only is 
secret but also susceptible to, in some at least jurisdictions, benefit from trade 
secret protection.54  
 
The Commission’s reluctance to legislate has been linked to a more general 
move towards a post-regulation society.55 Aspects of platforms’ intermediary 
function are indeed mostly shaped by internal rather than legislative standards. 
Uber’s Community Guidelines are a case in point. The platform’s code of conduct 
regulates the respective behaviour of riders and drivers and requires mutual 
respect and common courtesy such as ‘not to shout, swear or slam the car door’.56 
Beyond such hopefully obvious behavioural guidelines the platform has also 
established principles of a more controversial nature such as the ‘no sex rule’ 
pursuant to which there should be ‘no sexual conduct between drivers and riders, 
no matter what’, phrased as an intention to not only apply during the ride, but 
generally (i.e. preventing rider and driver from arranging a subsequent date 
followed by sexual intimacy).57 The Uber Community Compact also addresses 
safety, providing that passengers buckle up and prohibits guns, even in 
jurisdictions where carrying a gun is per se legal.58 While Uber doesn’t allow 
minors to use others’ accounts it has created ‘Teen accounts’ in some cities.59 This 
illustrates that platform self-regulation can easily be fashioned to enable algorithm-
facilitated regulatory fragmentation depending on location.  
Platform self-regulation comes with its own enforcement mechanism. In the 
United States Uber sanctions non-respect of its internal rules by delisting the 
driver or rider. Riders are delisted where they damage property, hurt someone or 
engage in flirting or sexual contact with drivers or fellow riders; where 
inappropriate or abusive language or gestures are used; where unwanted contact 
occurs after the drive or where local laws are broken.60 It is apparent that the 
platform imposes rules beyond those created by the legal framework that are 
incentivised by the market and public relation concerns and tailored to increase 
trust in the platform. 
                                                     
54 Gianclaudio Malgieri, ‘Trade Secrets v Personal Data: A Possible Solution for Balancing Rights’ (2016) 
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58 Ibid.  
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Platform self-regulation can also be mandated by public authorities. 
California adopted a self-regulatory response to ride-sharing platforms with the 
creation of Transportation Network Companies (‘TNCs’) whereby public 
authorities define standards that drivers of smartphone-based point-to-point urban 
transportation vehicles must conform to.61 Enforcement responsibility is delegated 
to the platforms themselves.62 This amounts to ‘coerced self-regulation’ whereby 
industry formulates rules under the threat of governmental regulation.63 A further 
example of self-regulation can be observed in respect of the global free-lancing 
platform Upwork.64 The platform imposed a ‘minimum rate’ for all work 
contracted via its intermediary function, notwithstanding which corner of the 
world it is being performed in, of $3 per hour.65 While this appears to be an 
incredibly low sum, the imposition of the minimum rate itself is an intriguing 
example of self-regulation, especially when contrasted with many jurisdictions that 
do not have minimum wage provisions. The policy highlights the potential for 
platforms to in principle determine such standards, which can then be 
automatically enforced through the platform’s algorithm much more 
straightforwardly than public authorities can. Code is, unlike any other normative 
systems, self-executing and can govern behaviour easily, which is probably the 
strongest argument in favour of self-regulation.  
Technology governs online spaces, famously captured by the ‘code is law’ 
maxim.66 Code creates binding rules that may be known to all, but moreover has 
an enormous potential to nudge individuals into adopting a certain behaviour. 
Uber has been said to be engaged ‘in an extraordinary behind-the-scenes 
experiment in behavioral science to manipulate [its drivers] in the service of its 
corporate growth’ most notably through psychological inducements to influence 
when, where and how they work.67 Under a model of pure self-regulation code 
regulates behaviour unrestrictedly. We should moreover be careful to not mistake 
code as merely regulate online behaviour as it increasingly governs offline 
behaviour through online standards, a phenomenon likely to dramatically increase 
with the advent of the Internet of Things.  
 
3. Assessment  
Self-regulation has, unsurprisingly, attracted wide support from industry insiders. 
Gossman, a general manager at the venture capital firm Union Square Ventures 
                                                     
61 Rebecca Elliott, ‘Sharing App or Regulation Hack(ney)?: Defining Uber Technologies, Inc.’ (2016) 41 
Journal of Corporation Law 727. 
62 Ibid. 
63 Julia Black, ‘Decentring Regulation: Understanding the Role of Regulation and Self-Regulation in a 
“Post-Regulatory” World’ (n 28) 118. 
64 https://www.upwork.com. 
65 https://support.upwork.com/hc/en-us/articles/211062988-Minimum-Hourly-Rates. 
66 See ‘Lessig, Code and other Laws of Cyberspace’ (n 51). 
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advocates a ‘Regulation 2.0’ model that juxtaposes the ‘bureaucracy, friction and 
permission’ of current regulatory paradigms with the ‘transparency, accountability 
and innovation’ of ‘Regulation 2.0’.68 At present access restrictions such as licenses 
ensure policy goals and enforcement and accountability are expensive and 
burdensome. The 2.0 model would relax market access and employ ex-post 
evaluation mechanisms to inspect ‘large volumes of real-time data to hold actors 
accountable’.69 Many platforms are however likely to oppose the sharing of large 
quantities of behaviour-revealing data with public authorities. While such data-
sharing must be considered as a useful component of platform regulation it has to 
be noted that no such mechanisms are currently in place, underlining that by and 
large platforms self-regulate without any external checks.  
Self-regulation has also attracted support in academia, most vocally through 
Sundararajan. Traditionally, government intervention has served to establish trust 
in market transactions. Sundararajan stresses that platforms now dispose of their 
own trust-enforcing mechanisms, most obviously peer-review mechanisms that 
can fulfil that same function more efficiently.70 Self-regulation through code is 
moreover considered to more easily being able to distinguish between various 
scenarios such as full-time or large-scale professional providers and smaller, 
semiprofessional providers.71 Ogus moreover considers that there is a public 
interest justification for self-regulation if three conditions are fulfilled: ‘first, that 
the activity is afflicted by some form of market failure, notably externalities or 
information asymmetries; secondly, that private law instruments are inadequate or 
too costly to correct the failure; and, thirdly, that self-regulation is a better 
(cheaper) method of solving the problem than conventional public regulation’.72 
While these conditions appear prima facie present in the platform economy 
context we must nonetheless be careful about giving in to this option too readily.  
It can hardly be denied that there are convincing arguments to apply 
alternative regulatory paradigms to the digital platform economy. Yet regulators 
should not be overly impressed by platforms’ claims to distinctiveness and the 
resulting unsuitability of other regulatory paradigms. We should not encourage 
platforms’ transformation into purely self-regulating oligopolies that act outside of 
any oversight mechanisms. Isolated self-regulation not only lacks transparency but 
moreover fails to account for the interests of actors other than the platform itself. 
It moreover risks being put to the side when problems actually arise. Indeed, while 
we have observed above that Uber wants to prevent sexual contact between 
drivers and riders, it it repeatedly acted in grossly unacceptable ways when faced 
                                                     
68 ‘Gossman, Regulation the Internet Way’ (n 55). 
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70 Ibid, 141. 
71 Ibid. 
72 Anthony Ogus, ‘Rethinking Self-Regulation’, in Robert Baldwin, Colin Scott and Christopher Hood 
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with cases of sexual assault and rape.73 This highlights the biased incentives 
platforms have in respect of policing themselves. Fearing public opinion backlash 
platforms may chose to protect their own image rather than stick to principle. 
Further, where self-regulation applies there is a need for counterbalances that 
safeguard public interests. Regarding data access and ownership, an issue residing 
at the core of platforms’ operation, the Commission considers that any principled 
openness towards sector-specific regulation should account for power imbalances 
impacting on negotiating power as market-based solutions alone are not sufficient 
‘to ensure fair and innovation-friendly results, facilitate easy access for new market 
entrants and avoid lock-in situations’.74 While we may welcome Upwork’s 
introduction of a minimum rate and the ease with which it can be enforced we can 
also perceive why we would prefer for the platform to determine rate levels not in 
isolation but rather collaboratively with public authorities and other interest 
groups.  
We must at this stage return to the theme of information asymmetries. While 
it is doubtlessly true that platforms themselves own myriads of data that regulators 
lack access to, they do not have an overview of all the information required to 
make regulatory decisions. Indeed, while it is often assumed that industry has all 
the knowledge and public authorities have none, oftentimes ‘no single actor has all 
the knowledge required to solve complex, diverse, and dynamic problems, and no 
single actor has the overview necessary to employ all the instruments needed to 
make regulation effective’.75 Specifically with respect to platforms we may argue 
that while Airbnb has considerably more data points regarding home-sharing in a 
given city, and can more easily enforce a, say, 30-day limit for home-sharing 
through its algorithm, the city and its residents are in a more adequate position to 
determine whether and to what extent home-sharing should be limited in light of 
its unique housing situation and preferences. 
Furthermore, while it is hard to deny that internal rating-mechanisms and 
peer-review options are fascinating trust-enforcing mechanisms that impact on the 
need for State-intervention in at least some respects we simply don’t know enough 
about them to allow them to replace public safeguards.76 There is a continuing lack 
of insight into the functioning of rating mechanisms and further research from 
                                                     
73 In the UK, Uber has for instance been accused of not reporting sexual assault committed by one of its 
driver while riding for the platform, allowing the driver to strike again thereafter. See Press Association, 
‘Uber failing to report Sex Attacks by Drivers, Says Met Police’  The Guardian (13 August 2017) 
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victim’s medical records. See further Mike Isaac, ‘Uber is sued by Woman who was raped by one of its 
Drivers in India’. New York Times (15 Juen 2017) 
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behavioral psychology and management is imperative. From the perspective of 
EU law, it must moreover be stressed that there is a risk that platform self-
regulation breaches competition law.77 The absence of uniform regulatory 
standards under self-regulatory models can moreover result in case-by-case 
litigation to determine applicable rules, which is undesirable for both platforms 
but also the regulator.78 
Even critics of regulation argue that ‘a disembodied free market, one which 
does not rest upon government force, will function effectively is certainly a 
mistake of epic proportions, is not an anarchist myth’.79 A purely self-regulatory 
approach moreover risk increasing platform power, which is already an increasing 
concern.80 Platforms which we still tend to think of as disruptive innovators that 
can just as quickly be replaced by the next disruptive idea have long become 
incumbents. This realization is critical as if online platforms are left to self-regulate 
their industry free from outside interference there is a risk that they act on their 
interest in heightening regulatory barriers in order to prevent the market entry of 
competitors.  
We thus conclude that while there are arguments in favour of alternative 
regulatory solutions adapted to the digital economy pure forms of self-regulation 
are undesirable. This leads us to examine co-regulation as an alternative.  
 
 
 
C. CO-REGULATED PLATFORMS  
 
The above sections have identified pertinent reasons why command-and-control 
and self-regulation present considerable disadvantages. We thus continue our 
search for an appropriate regulatory paradigm by looking towards co-regulation. 
In the EU context, co-regulation has been defined as a ‘mechanism whereby an 
[EU] legislative act entrusts the attainment of the objectives defined by the 
legislative authority to parties which are recognized in the field (such as economic 
operators, the social partners, non-governmental organizations, or associations)’.81 
EU legislation accordingly sets out objectives to be attained but their achievement 
is entrusted to non-public actors in economic and social domains, which appears 
to imply that the method is considered suitable for economic and social regulatory 
objectives. While the EU is seldom seen to overtly embrace co-regulatory 
                                                     
77 For a discussion, see Imelda Maher, ‘Competition Law and Transnational Private Regulatory Regimes: 
Marking the Cartel Boundary’ (2011) 38 Journal of Law and Society 119. For this to be the case there 
would need to be coordination between different would-be competitor platforms that limits competition 
between them.  
78 Edward Glaeser and Andrei Shleifer, ‘The Rise of the Regulatory State’ (2003) 41 Journal of Economic 
Literature 401, 402-03. 
79 Richard Epstein, ‘Can Technological Innovation Survive Government Regulation?’ (2013) 36 Harvard 
Journal of Law and Public Policy 87, 88. 
80 Orla Lynskey (n 18). 
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solutions Sabel and Zeitlin have shown that the Union in fact often relies on 
framework goals that lower units are then given freedom to achieve.82 This essay 
suggests that a more sophisticated version of co-regulation, which entrusts not just 
the Union and platforms, but is rather fashioned in a polycentric manner through 
the additional involvement of other stakeholders, as the most appropriate 
regulatory response to the platform economy.  
Co-regulation denotes various regulatory phenomena that have in common 
that ‘the regulatory regime is made up of a complex interaction of general 
legislation and a self-regulatory body’.83 It thus encompasses hybrids that do not 
meet the ‘administrative and statute-based legitimacy of regulation, yet clearly 
perform some elements of public policy more than self-regulation’.84 In essence, 
this regulatory solution creates collaboration between public authorities and 
private bodies to regulate private activity while accounting for its particularities 
and safeguarding public policy objectives. Acknowledging the complex interaction 
between the State, the market, and increasingly also technology, co-regulation 
reflects the spirit of new governance approaches that recognize the ‘benefits to 
including a broader pool of stakeholders and decision makers in the articulation, 
execution and evolution of policy, law, norms development, oversight and 
regulation’.85 Co-regulation has also been referred to as ‘regulated self-regulation’ 
emphasizing the interplay between the regulator and the regulated.86  
It is important to bear in mind that co-regulation does not amount to 
deregulation. Public authorities are involved at all stages of the process from the 
definition of the legislative framework to the complex review mechanisms. Indeed, 
in order for co-regulation to work, it must not only be accompanied by regular 
evaluations and reviews, but in addition ‘command-and-control regulation must 
exist as a possibility in the background in the event of the failure of self-regulation 
so that important objectives can still be achieved and enterprises are motivated to 
co-operate’.87  
 
1. Examples of Co-Regulation  
While the EU is maintaining its wait-and-see approach a number of co-regulatory 
solutions have been adopted at subnational level in various Member States. We 
focus on agreements between national regulators and home-sharing platforms, as 
they are to date the most paradigmatic example in this context. Airbnb and 
                                                     
82 Charles Sabel and Jonathan Zeitlin, ‘Learning from Difference: The New Architecture of 
Experimentalist Governance in the EU’ (2008) 14 European Law Journal 271, 273. 
83 Christopher Marsden, Internet Co-Regulation (Cambridge University Press 2011) 46. 
84 Ibid, 211. 
85 Raymond Brescia, ‘Regulating the Sharing Economy: New and Old Insights into an Oversight Regime 
for the Peer-to-Peer Economy’ (2016) 95 Nebraska Law Review 87, 134. 
86 See Wolfgang Hoffmann-Riem, Verwaltungsrechtsreform – Ansätze am Beispiel des Umweltschutzes, 
in Wolfgang Hoffmann-Riem et al (eds), Reform des Allgemeinen Verwaltungsrechts – Grundfragen (Baden-
Baden 1993) 115, 140. See also Wolfgang Schulz and Thorsten Held (n 36). 
87 Wolfgang Schulz and Thorsten Held (n 15) 63. 
  
Michèle Finck                                          Digital Regulation 
 
 
 17 
Amsterdam have signed a memorandum of understanding designed to ‘promote 
responsible home sharing’ that introduces automated limits to ensure that entire-
home listings are not shared for more than sixty days.88 Similar models have been 
adopted in other European cities such as London where this agreement 
encompasses a 90-day period.89 Beyond the determination of local time-limits 
enforced by platforms, arrangements have reached concerning tax-collection. In 
Lisbon Airbnb collects tourist tax on behalf of hosts. 90 In France, Airbnb has 
concluded agreements with nineteen cities pursuant to which it collects tourist 
taxes on behalf of them.91 Between October and December 2015 it had collected 
1,2 million Euro of fiscal income in Paris alone.92 
Some platforms have shown a general openness towards such solutions. 
Airbnb’s ‘Community Compact’ sets out guiding principles to develop 
partnerships with cities.93 It announces that the platform is open to working with 
cities on a case-by-case basis, accepting different rules for the city in question, 
including tax-collection on behalf of local governments.94 Airbnb considers that in 
‘[w]orking together, platforms like Airbnb can help governments collect millions 
of dollars in hotel and tourist tax revenue at little cost’95 and ‘provide data to local 
policymakers to enable smarter decision-making about home sharing rules without 
compromising hosts’ or guests’ privacy rights’.96 The formalities of such data 
sharing presently remain exclusively regulated by the platform itself – maintaining 
a stance of self-regulation in this respect.97  We return to this theme just below. 
A pivotal argument for involving platforms in regulation is that many 
regulatory objectives can be fulfilled much more efficiently through their 
involvement. Airbnb can simply program its algorithm to collect tourist tax 
whereas we know that ensuring tax compliance is a costly a burdensome task for 
public authorities, too often qualified by limited success. Much has already been 
said about the centrality of trust and peer-review mechanisms as a variant of 
technological regulation. It is however important to remember that these 
mechanisms serve regulatory functions beyond peer-review, including the 
verification and digitalization of official identification documents and institutional 
membership data. This highlights that governments de facto no longer have the 
exclusive capacity to function as intermediaries mediating the relationship between 
economic and social actors. Co-regulation forms part of a general evolution from 
top-down State regulation to participatory models of rule making, compliance and 
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enforcement in which subnational and non-State actors intervene.98 While it 
doesn’t replace the EU in its legislative function, the Union transitions from a 
monopolistic regulator to a regulative facilitator.99 Co-regulation also impacts the 
role of other actors, such as courts, which are no longer the pivotal centre of 
accountability and blurs the distinction between law-making and the application of 
law. In light of these various characteristics co-regulation appears are the most 
suitable regulatory paradigm for the early days of the sharing economy.  
 
2. The Case for Co-Regulation  
Scott and Trubeck consider that where a number of characteristics are present 
new governance approaches such as co-regulation are more suitable than 
command-and-control regulation. These include, firstly, increasing complexity 
under conditions of uncertainty; secondly the irreducible diversity of the 
phenomenon, which do not allow for uniform solutions and, thirdly, competence 
creep.100  As the implications of the platform economy continue to puzzle 
observers, it is difficult to imagine unitary rules applying to highly diverse 
platforms, especially given that the boundaries of EU competence are challenged. 
Indeed, looking towards home-sharing platforms such as Wimdu, Homeaway or 
Airbnb we can easily see the desirability of uniform rules governing their internal 
market aspects yet also see the limits of EU regulation concerning urban housing 
policy. In this context we may also add the geographical divide between Member 
States on digital policy, exemplified by the Northern Data Framework.101   
It is crucial to note that co-regulation is not a one-point intervention but 
rather an on-going process, making it an experimental learning process that 
embraces uncertainty and is designed to adapt over time. Tools can be quickly 
adjusted to new situations, information is constantly gathered and divergent 
interests are reconciled. One of co-regulation’s essential features is that the 
standards that are defined are constantly evaluated and reviewed. 102 It is as such 
particularly well suited to a novel and paradigm-changing phenomenon, especially 
where assessment is facilitated by big data analysis, which allows for real-time 
evaluations of regulatory goals. The fact that unlike top-down legislation co-
regulation involves constant dialogue, assessment and reviews creates 
informational and adaptability advantages that not only relate to economic 
rationales but can also be harnessed to achieve public goods.  
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When debating the benefits of co-regulation we must first note that in an age 
of de facto self-regulation, co-regulation would enable States and the EU to re-enter the 
debate and ensure that public policy objectives are complied with. While co-
regulation has elements of ‘non state law’ it is backed by robust government 
involvement through the definition of the corresponding legislative framework 
and review processes.103 It is in this respect worth noting that the General Court 
has also already established in UEAPME that co-regulation is only legitimate 
where the ‘representativeness’ of the relevant stakeholders is given.104 Co-
regulation should indeed not be understood as the deregulation of public interests 
as the legislative framework guiding co-regulatory conversations can see to this 
effect.105  
The second argument in favour of a co-regulatory approach is that of 
information asymmetry. Platforms are data monopolies and regulators lack the 
necessary data points to make informed decisions. Max Weber alerted us that 
‘those who continuously participate in the market intercourse with their own 
economic interests have a far greater rational knowledge of the market and interest 
[in the] situation than the legislators and enforcement officers whose interest is 
only ideal’.106 Involving public and private actors, co-regulation can be seen as 
offering either the best or the worst of command-and-control and self-regulation. 
Choosing an optimistic approach, co-regulation can bear the promise of better 
norms created through compromise that facilitate innovation and experimentation 
while safeguarding public policy concerns.107 We must acknowledge that policy-
makers frequently simply do not dispose of the required skillset to engage with 
these phenomena. The involvement of private actors ensures that regulation is 
‘reflexive’, that is to say formulated in a way understood by the autonomous social 
systems it regulates.108 The involvement of private actors in the regulatory process 
should indeed not automatically been seen as pejorative. Pursuant to Minow 
‘[p]rivatization stimulates new knowledge and infrastructure by drawing new 
people into businesses previously handled by government’.109 Through co-
regulatory solutions the interests of the objects of regulation are not eclipsed but 
form a central part of the regulatory concept. Schulz and Held have stressed that 
this ‘makes information-gathering easier, mainly because the players in the 
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regulatory field (such as economic enterprises) are informed at first hand of 
ongoing developments’.110 Information asymmetry hence makes a clear point in 
favour of co-regulation. 
An additional argument is that of flexibility, which can take numerous forms. 
First, it is difficult to imagine a legislative solution that could apply to all platforms 
and all transactions on a given platform whether they be P2P or B2B. With respect 
to the so-called sharing economy flexible approaches would moreover allow 
regulation to distinguish between practices of true sharing and those merely 
denominated as such, which are often enabled by the same platform.111 The 
platform ecosystem is composed of very diverse players and co-regulation makes it 
easier to incorporate the flexibility needed to address variegated scenarios. Second, 
flexibility is necessary to keep up with the pace of change.  Innovation has always 
challenged regulators yet it has usually affected society as a slower pace (think 
about the new manufacturing processes that initiated the first industrial 
revolution) whereas the digital data-driven platform economy leaves regulators 
very little time to learn and adapt. As technology changes and experience grows 
regulation must be adapted, which highlights the value of regulatory 
experimentalism in this fast-changing and diverse industry. 112 Co-regulation, with 
its continued assessments and reports, can identify best practices and stimulate 
mutual learning. The Commission has recognised the value of regulatory 
experimentation in respect of data accessibility and advocates sector-specific 
experiments on standards.113 Specifically with respect to platforms, it has also 
encouraged public authorities to ‘pilot innovative regulatory approaches to verify 
the feasibility and sustainability of innovative solutions’ in light of their complexity 
and changing nature.114  
Co-regulation moreover allows for the reconciliation of stark centralizing and 
decentralizing forces that characterize the platform economy. There are indeed 
convincing arguments in favour of EU legislation accounting for the internal 
market rationale but also against it given that regulators should keep the ability to 
regulate phenomena in light with their respective particularities. The Commission 
considers that ‘there cannot be 28 different sets of rules for online platforms in a 
single market’. 115 Yet, on the other hand it is hard to envisage a one-fit all solution 
given the diversity of platforms that have emerged and their often variegated 
impact across and within Member States. The external consequences of platforms, 
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such as their impact on urban policy, cannot be addressed in a homogenous 
manner but rather must allow for geographical variation. Under a co-regulatory 
approach standards can be determined at EU level but national and subnational 
actors remain free to determine the precise contours thereof in collaboration with 
the platform. 
Finally co-regulatory solutions offer an ease of enforcement that cannot be 
achieved under top-down legislation. We have already observed above that where 
home-sharing platforms have co-regulated in collaboration with local 
governments, platforms themselves have been entrusted with the enforcement of 
the resulting policies in the context of their intermediary function. It cannot be 
ignored that platforms can, through a simple twisting of code, secure that 
prosumers pay taxes and comply with time-limits. Regulators need to invest 
considerably more effort and money into to ensure compliance, often with much 
lower rates of success. An example serves to make this point. Munich, a city faced 
with rapid expansion and short housing supply, prohibits that residential space be 
continuously used for commercial purposes such as vacation rental.116 In the 
absence of any agreement with home-sharing platforms, it policies this policy itself 
and has hired a number of staff to specifically do so. This has however had a very 
limited success as in 2015 only a handful of actors breaching this prohibition could 
be identified, out of an estimated 4000 in total.117  
From the perspective of platforms, the benefits of engaging in co-regulatory 
efforts are self-evident. While it leaves them less autonomy than self-regulation, 
co-regulation nonetheless allows intermediaries to evade command-and-control 
regulation. Beyond their seat at the table, engagement in such processes can 
benefit their image and enhance trust in the platform. Co-regulation can focus on 
outcomes rather than process, meaning that public authorities define the 
objectives to be achieved through standards rather than precise legal rules, leaving 
platforms to decide how to best achieve them, encouraging flexibility and 
adaptability, and, providing room for manoeuvre to platforms. 
Returning to the distinction between platforms’ internal operation and their 
external consequences, we conclude that co-regulation presents useful advantages 
for both contexts. Regarding platforms’ internal regulation it is clear that they have 
most information concerning their operation and are in the best position to 
implement EU standards on, say, consumer protection. Turning to their external 
consequences we can equally perceive that co-regulation proves helpful as it allows 
actors other than the EU to define policies in conjunction with platforms, as 
illustrated by the collaborations between home-sharing platforms and local 
governments highlighted above. The information platforms have is thus existential 
to any co-regulatory approach. Access to such information is likely to prove to be 
the most delicate aspect of co-regulatory approaches. 
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3. Data-Sharing as a Quid pro Quo of Co-Regulation  
We have already observed that information asymmetry is a key consideration of 
platform regulation. Platforms’ algorithms are ‘black boxes’ and the big data they 
run on is proprietary and closed.118 Whereas intermediaries have full knowledge of 
their internal operation, regulators are largely left to guess. Co-regulation 
accordingly has to provide for some variant of data sharing to allow regulators to 
acquire the necessary information and determine whether platforms enforce the 
determined standards. The treatment of personal and non-personal data however 
remains one of the most contentious topics in the digital economy and platforms 
are likely to show reluctance to share data, considering that it is their most valuable 
asset. While questions of data ownership and access are a sensitive topic with a 
much broader significance to the digital economy this section merely provides a 
cursory overview of the stakes at hand. It is however worth noting from the outset 
that the closed nature of platforms’ operation is likely to come under increased 
scrutiny as the European Parliament has recently called for more transparency in 
respect of platforms’ algorithms.119 
An agreement concluded between Milan and Airbnb illustrates that data-
sharing can form an integral part of a regulatory solutions under which a platform 
is tasked with enforcing rules. Milan and Lombardy approved rules that allow local 
residents to share their homes via Airbnb but required that, as a counterpart, the 
platform provide support for major events; help increase digital literacy of seniors; 
and share data.120 Little is known concerning the exact data that has been shared, 
Airbnb having only revealed that ‘[w]e want to be good partners to policy makers 
in Milan and support them with meaningful data on our community and the 
benefit it brings’.121 The home-sharing intermediary appears generally open to – at 
least in a limited manner – share data with public authorities. It received 188 
requests for data access from governments in the first six months of 2016 and 
provided data in response to 82 of those requests.122 In other cities such as New 
Orleans, the platform moreover shared data pertaining to hosts’ names and 
addresses.123  Data sharing is at present self-regulated by the platform. Its 
‘Community Compact’ announces openness to data sharing, stating that it will 
‘provide cities with the information they need to make informed decisions about 
home sharing policies’.124 The information that is revealed is however relatively 
generic, including ‘Home Sharing Activity Reports’ in cities with a significant 
presence that outline: the total annual economic activity generated by the Airbnb 
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community; income earned by a ‘typical’ host; the number of hosts having avoided 
eviction or foreclosure due to sharing income; the number of days a typical listing 
is rented on the platform and the average number of days guests stay in cities.125 
It is true that one of the perceived advantages of co-regulatory standards 
being left to enforce to platforms is that it dispenses them from a need to hand 
over large quantities of data to public authorities. Yet it is equally evident that for 
purposes of auditing and review public authorities must be in a position to 
evaluate whether platforms conform to the determined standards and they cannot 
do so without access to the data. A number of solutions can be envisaged in this 
context. The most radical option would be to allow unrestrained access to data to 
public authorities that however raises a number of concerns for platforms and 
personal data protection, especially as sophisticated methods of reverse-
engineering make  a total anonymization of data less likely. Softer solutions can 
however also be envisaged, such as the replacement of large-scale data audits with 
application programming interfaces (APIs) tailored to government auditing 
purposes126 and we can also think of data-sampling as another solution in this 
context. While questions of data-sharing will probably have to be determined on a 
case-by-case basis we now turn to an element that should be present in all contexts 
of co-regulation, namely an ample involvement of variegated stakeholders.  
 
4. Towards a Model of Polycentric Co-Regulation  
The early days of the platform economy are marked by the regulatory involvement 
of nongovernmental norm-generating actors through industry self-regulation. 
Together with the centrality of subnational authorities, we move away from 
homogenous top-down model towards a decentralised, reflexive, collaborative and 
cooperative framework that is process orientated and shaped by standards. This 
framework is in its essence polycentric as it is characterized by the cooperation of 
the State, civil society and the market. As life moves from ‘walls’ to ‘webs’, law 
follows.127  
Polycentricity is inherent to new governance models as unlike traditional 
conceptions of law that rely on a unitary source of authority ‘new governance is 
predicated upon a dispersal and fragmentation of authority, and rests upon fluid 
systems of power sharing’.128  If we adhere to a strict co-regulation approach, only 
industry and the EU would cooperate to regulate platforms. The argument 
advanced in this section is that a polycentric regulatory network, encompassing 
                                                     
125 Ibid.  
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additional stakeholders, would be preferable for it is likely to generate better 
results and echoes the nature of the platform economy itself.  
Co-regulation generates pluralism as binding rules emerge from the 
interaction of multiple actors outside the hierarchical State structure.129 A 
regulatory mesh has emerged where ‘self-regulation and state regulation intertwine 
and reciprocally complement each other’ so that they are ‘interdependent in the 
creation, adoption, application, implementation and enforcement of regulation’.130 
As currently envisaged, co-regulation of the platform economy would lead to a 
situation where the EU defines legislative standards that are subsequently 
implemented by platforms. This would be characterised by a number of features, 
including (i) participation and power sharing as power is not monopolized at 
supranational level but shared by those participating in the exercise; (ii) multi-level 
integration as innovative regulatory solutions have been adopted by subnational 
actors across the Union that now serve as blueprints for regulation elsewhere; (iii) 
diversity and decentralization given that the impossibility of uniform regulation is 
acknowledged; (iv) deliberation among multiple stakeholders takes place as the EU 
doesn’t regulate in isolation. The resulting rules would moreover be characterised 
by (v) flexibility and revisability as they are constantly evaluated and can be swiftly 
adapted; and (vi) experimentation and knowledge creation as the various concrete 
applications of the general standards will reveal manifold indicators as to the 
suitability of a given standard.131  It can be readily seen that these features of co-
regulatory approaches would be further developed if a wider variety of actors were 
involved. 
Polycentric co-regulation would indeed present a number of benefits. It has 
long been known that polycentric decision-making allows for the concentration of 
knowledge, which is naturally dispersed across society.132 This would remedy the 
currently prevailing information asymmetries and allow to make regulation fit for 
purpose. Polycentric co-regulation would be furthermore in line with the 2015 
Better Regulation Agenda that promotes evidence-based regulation, including 
broader consultations and civic engagement.133 While polycentricity brings more 
actors to the table and accordingly generates complexity, the various players have 
incentives to work together efficiently, solve conflicts and create certainty and 
stability, objectives that serve as a common denominator. More generally, 
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polycentric co-regulation operates in the context of ‘decentring regulation’ 
qualified by Black as ‘the observation that governments do not, and the 
proposition that they should not, have a monopoly on regulation’134 as regulation 
occurs ‘within and between other social actors’.135 Said approach would in addition 
be a natural continuance of the current situation, as regulatory conversations on 
the platform economy are already polycentric in that they are transnational and 
multi-sectoral.136 They also involve a multitude of levels of public authority, most 
notably local governments, whose regulatory pioneering has provided valuable 
learning experiences for other regulators. In formulating its recommendations on 
the collaborative economy in 2016 the Commission as a matter of fact drew 
inspiration from urban policies across the EU.137  
Polycentricity can be stimulated by the same technological shift that underlies 
platforms’ emergence. Indeed, the reliance on new digital avenues for participation 
and deliberation could increase networked policy-making and widen alternative 
spaces and forms of policy dialogues. This would fit naturally with existing 
initiatives such as ‘Lighten the Load’, an online feedback form that allows citizen 
to express views on EU regulation at any time and on any topic.138 Specifically 
with regards to platforms, the Commission operated an online public consultation 
between September 2015 and January 2016.139 Open to anyone, it enabled 
interested parties to communicate perspectives on platforms to the 
Commission.140 Over time such consultations could gain more traction, attract 
higher numbers of participants and be modified to allow broader scope for 
individual comment outside pre-determined questions, which was not the case on 
this occasion.141 Out of concerns of space we cannot further elaborate on this 
initiative but it should be stressed that such openness permits an entire range of 
industry associations, academic centers, think thanks, companies and platforms to 
share their views.142 
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Platforms themselves have long learned to rely on technology’s civic 
potential.143 The probably most prolific example is Uber’s introduction of a ‘de 
Blasio’ feature on its app for NYC users, indicating how much slower a ride were 
if the mayor’s planned policy was implemented, followed by a link to a petition to 
oppose it.144 The EU should follow suit. It is certainly true that online 
participation is not free from problems as it creates a cacophony of voices and 
raises difficult questions of legitimacy, self-selection, undue influence and bias. 
Yet, evidence mounts that digital tools are having an overall positive impact on 
civic engagement.145 Online consultation enables speedy and broad consultation 
and crowdsourcing in addition to e-petitions, which are considered to improve 
dialogue between civil society and lawmakers.146  More widely, technological 
innovation is impacting on democratic processes through online discussion 
forums, online petition sites that are now also hosted by Parliaments across the 
EU, and social media.147 Such processes should be increasingly used by the EU, 
also in respect of the European Citizens’ Initiative, and are particularly suited for 
deliberation on digital transformation, including the platform economy. 
This section has made the point for a polycentric approach to co-regulation. 
In the subsequent section we will see that a widening of the network of 
contributing agents could bear the potential to lend increased legitimacy to the 
adopted solutions. 
 
 
 
5. Co-Regulation, Democracy and Legitimacy 
In addition to bearing the promise of better regulatory outcomes polycentric co-
regulation could also address on-going concerns regarding the legitimacy and 
democratic quality of supranational law making. If co-regulatory processes are not 
the exclusive domain of the State or the supranational entity it has conferred 
competence on, we must wonder how far it can correspond to our ideals of 
democracy and legitimacy. In circumstances of polycentric co-regulation, the 
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Union’s role shifts to standard setting, coordination, control and facilitation. While 
it passes initial framework legislation private actors are largely in charge of its 
implementation as the EU turns into an evaluator and a forum of debate and 
information that promotes best practices.  
Yet, assuming that the procedure behind EU secondary legislation constitutes 
the apex of democracy and legitimacy would ignore reality. The EU has long been 
plagued by accusations of democratic deficit and lack of legitimacy.148 Even if we 
abstract from this meta-diagnosis and look at the concrete instance of regulating 
platforms two realistic options emerge. First, the passing of top-down legislation 
influenced by industry preferences, that are however voiced through lobbying 
behind closed doors, or, alternatively, a co-regulatory process where such 
involvement is made explicit and transparent. Indeed, the claim advanced in this 
closing section is that alternative methods of governance can be seen as not 
necessarily undermining but rather the stimulating democratic deliberation in the 
EU.149  
Modes of governance reflect a concern on behalf of the EU to secure higher 
legitimacy for its policymaking.150 Scott and Trubek observed that their emergence 
‘may be explained in part by the contested legitimacy’ of the supranational 
legislative process’.151 In contrast to self-regulation, co-regulation offers 
opportunities to bridge such concerns through the very technological shift that 
underlies platforms. In a co-regulatory platform-regulation process, the number of 
actors intervening can be radically expanded as technology itself can facilitate 
stakeholder involvement in ad hoc consultations but also in giving new lifeblood 
to existing mechanisms, such as the European Citizens’ Initiative.152 We however 
agree with Verbruggen that ‘if co-regulation is to strengthen the legitimacy of EU 
governance, the EU should set out in greater detail and in a consistent fashion 
what it aspires to do with co-regulation, under what conditions co-regulation may 
be applied and what effects co-regulation may generate’.153 
The emergence of a participatory and collaborative governance model in 
which public authorities, industry representatives, society and other stakeholders 
co-regulate feeds into traditional regulatory bodies’ legitimacy crisis triggered by 
the emergence of the Internet, echoed by the until the early 2000s dominant 
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perception that the Internet knows no borders and escapes territorial regulation.154 
In the future we are likely to be faced with the question of the democratic 
legitimacy of the crowd as technological developments enable novel forms of 
participation and deliberation. This leads us to observe that as digital technologies 
transcend geographic boundaries and yield localized results, they also present the 
opportunity to develop a networked public sphere that can transform policy-
making processes for the better. Multi-stakeholder bodies that include 
governments at various scales, industry, consumers and providers but also social 
scientists and other stakeholders provide room for deliberation whereas platform 
self-regulation and regulation by code do not.155  As such we might argue that co-
regulation can be more consistent with democratic, participatory, and 
representative ideals, especially where it operates as a polycentric process involving 
prosumers and other stakeholders. A process fashioned in this manner recognizes 
pluralism and allows for decentralization in addition to facilitating 
experimentation. We should not least stress the transparency gains that can be 
achieved through such an approach where firms influence the regulatory scheme 
in an open polycentric process rather than through lobbying. No doubt, the above 
is the view of an optimist. Yet, in light of the arguments against self-regulation and 
top-down regulation advanced above they are worth experimenting with.  
 
 
 
III. CONCLUSION 
 
This essay has examined various regulatory design options for the platform 
economy, bearing in mind platforms’ internal operation as well as external 
consequences. Throughout history disruptive technologies have transformed 
industries, markets and legal systems. From this perspective, the emergence of 
digital data-driven platforms is not unique. What makes it particularly challenging 
from a regulatory perspective, however, is the pace with which it progresses, 
which distinguishes digital transformation from earlier industrial revolutions. This 
challenges not least regulators that need to define the form and substance of 
platform regulation. Focusing largely on the first aspect, we have concluded that 
co-regulation must be favoured to top-down or self-regulation, at least in these 
early days of the platform economy. 
Co-regulatory solutions bear the potential to marry the benefits of both 
regulatory paradigms in harnessing the effectiveness of platform’s involvement in 
the regulatory process with public oversight. In this process, which relies on 
cooperation and dialogue, platforms and public authorities are collaborators rather 
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than adversaries. Such a process can allow for more informed decision-making, 
easier enforcement, and continuous review and assessment. The experimental 
nature of this process allows for mutual learning and the identification of best 
practices as well as for a dynamic adaptation of the relevant rules over time.  
It has moreover been argued that technological innovations underlying the 
platform economy should be mobilized to capture the polycentric nature of co-
regulation and involve a greater number of stakeholders. Co-regulation in itself 
bears the promise of polycentric governance capable of bringing multiple actors to 
the table, and, ultimately, addressing some of the legitimacy concerns plaguing 
supranational regulation. In using platforms as modes of deliberation and 
participation, the European Commission could ensure that the regulatory outcome 
is one that strikes an appropriate balance between the multiple interests involved 
in helping the digital economy thrive in generates certainty and trust while also 
protecting stakeholders.  
 
 
 
